From this Wittgenstein derives conclusion 7 of the work: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”

  (p.152) There are many books published on the argument and conclusion of the Tractatus. I do not claim to know many of them, and any expert will be able to find the shortcomings of my résumé. It may still serve as a reference for the use I will make of the text later.

  The work was not understood by many, and its aim and method has become clearer only over the years. One reason is that the text actually consists of two intermingled discourses. In one of his first attempts to get his manuscript published, Wittgenstein wrote to the prospective publisher Ludwig von Fricker:

  I wanted to write that my work consists of two parts: the one which is here, and of everything I have not written. And precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within, as it were, by my book; and I'm convinced that, strictly speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in this way.

  By making a formal scaffolding for all that can be stated and founding the boundary of this, Wittgenstein proclaimed that all “higher values” cannot be subjected to logical discourse. Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin [21] have convincingly argued that here we encounter a contribution to the discussions in the cafés of Vienna as described above. Moral considerations and beauty versus utility had been at the center of this discussion. In the satirical writings by Kraus, the language had been shown to say what could not be said.

  The possibilities and limitations of language had been at the center of the discourse. Already in 1901, the journalist‐turned‐philosopher Fritz Mautner had published his extensive work Contributions to a Critique of Language. Inspired by Schopenhauer, he investigated the use of language, and discussed both its role as a pictorial representation and its role as a tool of acting and living humans. Wittgenstein acknowledges the inspiration from Mautner in his typically aloof manner (Tractatus 4.0031): “All philosophy is a ‘critique of language’ (though not in Mauthner's sense).”

  Combined with the earlier presented discussion of the role of science, the analysis of language in Vienna was prepared for Wittgenstein. In the first decades, when he wrote his treatise, he took the logical tools and formulations from Frege and Russell, but the problems he set out to solve were formulated on the home range. His logical apparatus was based on them but also on a penetrating criticism of their approach. The things he did not write about, he took to be so essential to the human situation, that what he had proved implies that they could not be discussed in language. This was taken to be a positive statement of their character. Every reader was supposed to realize this transcendent truth. Only art can, in its most engaged form, give glimpses of the true human predicament.

  Thus Wittgenstein regarded his work as finished. He had shown that the world consists of what one can say, that only tautological expressions can be necessary, and that the many other issues showing themselves in the human situation, cannot be discussed in language. “Darüber muss man zweigen.” There (p.153) was to be no further need for philosophy, so Wittgenstein withdrew from the field as we have seen in his biography above.

  But the Tractatus consists mainly of a series of purely logical arguments. In order to state his world view Wittgenstein utilizes all the formal resources he found in Frege and Russell. He is, maybe, not so much a pupil as an independent laborer borrowing his tools from the masters of logic. Thus the work was seen as a contribution to formal logistics; its aim was to find the perfect language of philosophical discourse. Wittgenstein had no such aim in mind, but Russell seems to have got this impression when writing his introduction. But Russell, presumably, did not know the discussions in the cafés of Vienna.

  In order to formulate the linguistic possibilities to describe the world, Wittgenstein utilized the formal methods of logic. He was thus, in a way, providing the framework for the models Hertz had envisaged as the aim of physics too. All terms have to be used in their proper way, the propositions have to be joined in meaningful ways, and only complete statements can be set up against reality and found to be valid or not, true or false. Only those combinations which are relevant for reality can be seen as having sense. We cannot test the validity of incorrectly constructed pictures, and our language, if correctly used, cannot describe an impossible world.

  In the course of this activity, Wittgenstein introduced a terse language and formal constructions to test if statements make sense (truth tables). The text was formally compact and his statements were aphoristic instead of dialectic. The work thus offered a challenge to the logistic readership, which was eagerly taken up by the formal investigations into semantic and epistemological discussions of the concept of truth. Wittgenstein's conclusion was that in a language we cannot tell what cannot be said in that language. For a pure rationalist, this seems to be something of a triviality. We have, however, seen that Wittgenstein was claiming more: The language can be used to show when we approach this border; the limitations of language exclude all influences and motivations steering our lives. As we exist and act in the world, the conditions of existence show themselves but it is beyond human capacity to formulate them. These subtleties were lost on the pure logicians but were in concord with the later developments of Continental philosophy.

  Finishing this work, Wittgenstein believed he had disposed of the need for philosophizing. All possible questions were either scientific or empty; the former can but be decided by science, the latter can be disposed of as meaningless (Tractatus 6.53).

  5.3.2. Wittgenstein's influence

  The ground was fertile for the purely logistic aspects of philosophy, and Wittgenstein became a model for these developments at first. Frege and Russell had kindled the interest in the foundations of mathematics, and together with Whitehead, Russell was claiming that logic proved the firm foundation.

  (p.154) A group of rationally oriented scientists used to meet at the cafés in Vienna to discuss the ideas inherited from Mach and Hertz. Among others these consisted of the mathematician Hans Hahn (1880–1934), physicist Philipp Frank (1884– 1966), and economist Otto Neurath (1882–1945). These formed the precursor to the Vienna Circle still to be born. They were eventually to exert their influence over the German‐speaking realm, Frank in Prague, Neurath in Munich, Hahn in Vienna, where Neurath returned after a brief political adventure in Bavaria. When the chair of natural philosophy in Vienna was filled in 1922, the newcomer was Moritz Schlick (1882–1936), who was a physicist turned philosopher. He became the founder of the Vienna Circle starting in 1924, and he remained very influential up to the time when he was murdered by a mentally disturbed student. Among other early participants in the discussions, we may mention Viktor Kraft (1880–1975) and Friedrich Waismann (1896–1959). They were joined by the mathematician Kurt Gödel (1906–78) and Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970). These formed the center for the group referring to itself as the Vienna Circle in a pamphlet from 1929.

  The aim of the activity was to unify all branches of human knowledge, and derive all possible factual relations from unified and simple “protocol statements”, the elementary propositions of Wittgenstein or the atomic facts of Russell. The spirit is captured in Carnap's Logische Aufbau der Welt from 1928. Following the British empiricist, the original intention was to build the theory upon “sense impressions”. The endeavor did not lead to final satisfaction, partly because the elementary statements could not be agreed upon. The whole concept of meaning and nonsense was questioned by Carnap in Testability and Meaning from 1937–8. Similar conclusions are presented by Quine in Two Dogmas of Empiricism from 1953.

  The activity in Vienna became widely known. Foreign participants visited the group, learned their approach to philosophy, and brought home their ideas. Thus they were visited by Americans Ernest Nagel (1901–85) and W. v. O. Quine (1908–2000), the Brit A. J. Ayer (1910–89), and the Nordic researchers A. Næss (1912–2009) and E. Kaila (1890–1958). When Hitler took over power in Germany in 1933, all scientists of Jewish origin got into difficulties. The discussion circle in Vienna was closed down, and many of its representatives were dispersed. Neurath was visiting in Moscow and chose not to return but settled in the Hague. When the Germans conquered Holland in 1940, Neurath saved himself by fleeing to England. Carnap moved from Prague to the US in 1935. Popper did not belong to the Circle, but carried his brand of philosophy first to New Zealand and then to London. Waismann was received in Oxford. Gödel left for the US as late as in 1940. Thus the political upheaval in Europe dispersed the Viennese tradition in philosophy around the world, and the novel logical approach to conceptual investigations became known as a purely Anglo‐Saxon movement in spite of its many Austrian roots. Thus the cultural background of Wittgenstein's endeavor was misunderstood and forgotten.

  (p.155) 5.3.3. The later Wittgenstein

  Investigating language

  In addition to the Tractatus, the only work Wittgenstein prepared for publication is the Philosophical Investigations, which was published posthumously in 1968. This work, however, is based on an extensive body of work in progress. Much of this has later been published. To get a general view of “the late Wittgenstein” we may take his final approach to philosophy to be represented by the Philosophical Investigations. As his views were constantly changing and developing, this is far from the full truth, but it may remain a starting point for the discussion of his later attitudes. In the following, the abbreviation PI refers to this publication [77].

  The aim of Wittgenstein's Tractatus is to construct a solid theoretical structure for language, including a demarcation of its limits. Philosophical Investigations denies this possibility and is hence often regarded as radically different from the earlier thoughts. This is an oversimplification, because there is a clear line of development in his documented works. But the differences emerging form a significant part of the Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy: It does not aim at final systems or established results, but presents methods and offers doubts related to the use and misuse of language in different situations. This lack of formalized method makes Philosophical Investigations look different from customary philosophical writings and causes difficulties in extracting the insights presented. It is easy to misunderstand Wittgenstein's aims; indeed, one is bound to miss many of the subtle points. Thus in trying to summarize the contents of Philosophical Investigations, I am aware of the shortcomings of my text. These derive partly from the convolved presentation by Wittgenstein and partly from my limited understanding thereof.

  Wittgenstein chooses St Augustine as a representative of the idea that language is a mirror of the speaker's inner processes. Wittgenstein strongly disapproves of the posited existence of the inner person who thinks, plans, and speaks; this invites metaphysical speculations about a priori relations between words and external objects. As a model of language acquisition in a child, Augustine's description is clearly both dated and inadequate. It has been suggested that Wittgenstein chose this historical sample in order to avoid pointing out any contemporary philosophic movement. Be that as it may, his criticism could also have been carried by Plato. In the work Cratylus [95] there is a discussion of the role of language, which is exceptional in Plato's writings:

  The name is an instrument of teaching and distinguishing natures ….

  The thing may be named, and described, as long as the general character of the thing you are describing, is retained ….

  But we may admit so much that the knowledge of things is not to be derived from names ….

  What other ways can there be of knowing them [the names] except the true and natural way, through their affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through themselves?

  (p.156) Socrates' adversaries in this dialogue represent various metaphysical views of language. Cratylus believs that names are natural and derive from the inner truth of the named. His opponent, Hermogenes, claims that names are totally conventional, and any name chosen is as correct as any other one. Through his dialectical analysis, Socrates demonstrates the shortcomings of both views and presents his own synthesis of the argument about the art of naming.

  Foreshadowing Wittgenstein, Socrates argues that language is arbitrary but acquires meaning only by use and communication within a society of speakers with a common language.

  To repeat—naming is something like attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory to the use of a word. But what is it preparation for?(PI I–26)

  Language is, however, more complex than this description suggests. Questions like “What is time?” and “What is meaning?” appear to be clear when no answer is solicited, but baffle us when we try to formulate an answer. They are not scientific queries allowing a final elucidation of some definite answers. This violates our inherited thinking about the role of language.

  Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (PI I–109)

  The dissection of language Wittgenstein calls a grammatical investigation. For him this is an exploration of words as they are actually used. No explanation is possible or needed but only the description of practice. No stipulation of meaning is imposed on the observations.

  Philosophy leaves everything as it is.(PI II–124)

  Our intuitive feeling that language must be based on some underlying theoretical structure is without ground. A word is only what it is, and it carries with it intimately its own use.

  Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.(PI I–126)

  Wittgenstein's concept of grammar thus covers both syntactical and semantic aspects. Wittgenstein himself, however, would presumably deny the existence of these theoretical categories.

  A clear analysis leads to perspicuous representations.(PI I–122)

  When this is achieved, no philosophical questions remain; philosophy has come to an end.

  Once you know what the word stands for,you understand it, you know its whole use. (PI I–264)

  By applying the dialectical method of Wittgenstein to one conceptual situation after another, we do not learn a method but adjust our thinking from regarding the customary as obvious. This is like therapy, it turns our thinking.

  (p.157) Language‐in‐use can only function within a society sharing the same pattern of acting on verbal cues. There must be a communication nexus which allows sensible reactions to verbal utterances. This cannot be global, comprising everything experienced and possible to be communicated. The activity is confined to the nexus and has its life there. On being addressed, what you conclude is not the issue but only what you should do. The same individual may well be part of different nexuses, playing the violin and designing an engine do not necessarily reside in the same practices. Such reality‐adapted communication networks Wittgenstein calls “forms of life”.

  Wittgenstein considers the user's language mastery as a toolbox at his disposal. There are many kinds of tools adapted to many kinds of tasks. They aim at various different goals and attain them more or less adequately. There can be no universal toolbox, and hence the question of their completeness does not arise. Tools may be very differently adapted to different use. They are, however, related by a “family resemblance”; there is a possibility to combine them as tools not by a common feature of all but tracing through the box from one tool to a next one.

  A toolbox adapted to its communication needs Wittgenstein terms a “language game”. Their number and extension are not given. They rise and wane with the communication needs of the society that nurtures them.

  There are countless kinds [of propositions]: countless different kinds of use of what we call “symbols”, “words”, “sentences”. And the multiplicity is not something fixed, given once and for all; but new kinds of languages, language games as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.(PI 23)

  But even language games have to be learned. Wittgenstein draws attention to the difficulty of how to get started. Individual words can be pointed out, ostensive definitions, but this works only against a background fabric of practice. Sentences like: “This is red”, “This is number 5”, and “This is the king” work only if the concepts of color, number, or rules of chess are presupposed. How did we ever get started?

  The private and the environment

  What kind of ontology does Wittgenstein support? He dissects talking but what can we be talking about? He does seem to question that what is said is motivated by our experience, by what we “see”.

  “What I really see must surely be what is produced in me by the influence of the object.”— Then what is produced in me is a sort of copy, something that in its turn can be looked at, can be before one, almost something like a materialization.(PI II–199)

  This posits a mental image, the existence of which Wittgenstein cannot approve. However:

  When I imagine something, or even actually see objects, I have got something which my neighbor has not.(PI I–398)

  (p.158) Wittgenstein denies the sense of this claim to internal knowledge.

  Might I not ask: In what sense have you got what you are talking about and saying that only you have got it? Do you possess it? You do not even see it. Must you not really say that no one has got it? And this too is clear: if as a matter of logic you exclude other people's having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it. (PI I–398)

 

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